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Did Congress Intend For Corporations To
Benefit From The MVRA?

Securities and Exchange Commission investigated and prosecuted
Rajat Gupta (“Gupta”), a former employee of the multinational
investment banking firm, The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (“Goldman
Sachs”), for conspiracy and insider trading violations in United States
v. Gupta1, SEC v. Rajaratnam2 and related proceedings.3 Gupta had,
on multiple occasions, disclosed material nonpublic information that
he had obtained in his role as a director of Goldman Sachs to Raj
Rajaratnam (“Rajaratnam”), the founder and manager of the hedge
fund Galleon Management, LP.4 His unlawful disclosures included
providing information about Berkshire Hathaway Inc.’s $5 billion
investment in Goldman Sachs before public announcement as well as
Goldman Sachs’ financial results for the second and fourth quarters
of 2008.5 Additionally, Gupta disclosed financial results he obtained
through his role as director of The Procter & Gamble Company, which
Rajaratnam then relayed to others who traded on the information at
Galleon Management, L.P.6
In 2011, a jury convicted Rajaratnam of 14 counts of securities fraud
stemming from his illegal trades, sentenced him to 11 years in prison,
and ordered him to pay $150 million in fines and forfeitures.7 Later in
2012, a jury found Gupta guilty of conspiracy and securities fraud due
to his involvement in the insider trading scheme with Rajaratnam and
was later sentenced to 24 months in prison.8 In connection with those
investigations and the subsequent enforcement proceedings of United
States v. Gupta9 and SEC v. Rajaratnam,10 Goldman Sachs paid over $6.9
million in legal fees to its attorneys.
In United States v. Gupta,11 Goldman Sachs sought restitution from
a U.S. District Court in the Southern District of New York for the $6.9
million in legal fees it paid to Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, pursuant to
the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”).12 Goldman Sachs
848 F. Supp. 2d 491, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
2012 WL 362031 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2012).
3
See S.E.C. v. Rajaratnam, 822 F. Supp. 2d 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); S.E.C. v. Gupta, 281 F.R.D. 169
(S.D.N.Y. 2012).
4
See Rajaratnam, 822 F. Supp. 2d at 432; see also 11, Simon M. Lorne & Joy Marlene Bryan,
Criminal Convictions for Insider Trading, Acquisitions & Mergers § 1:29 (2013) (discussing Gupta’s
disclosures spanning from 2007 to January 2009).
5
Rajaratnam, 822 F. Supp. 2d at 432.
6
Id.
7
United States v. Rajaratnam, 802 F. Supp. 2d 491 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
8
See United States v. Gupta, 848 F. Supp. 2d 491, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); United States v. Gupta, 2012
WL 5246919 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2012).
9
848 F. Supp. 2d at 492.
10
822 F. Supp. 2d 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
11
2013 WL 662954 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2013).
12
18 U.S.C. § 3663A (Supp. 2012).
1
2
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incurred these legal fees when Sullivan & Cromwell assisted Goldman
Sachs in its internal investigation of Gupta, represented Goldman Sachs
and its directors, officers, and employees in responding to inquiries from
criminal and regulatory enforcement investigations, and represented
Goldman Sachs in the prosecutions of Gupta and Rajaratnam as well as
provided other legal services.13 In this case, the court viewed Goldman
Sachs as an “identifiable victim [that] suffered a . . . pecuniary loss.”14
Judge Rakoff stated that the MVRA “mandates restitution in a fraud
case like this”15 and such restitution could include “necessary . . .
other expenses incurred during participation in the investigation or
prosecution of the offense or attendance at proceedings related to the
offense.”16 The court noted that both the United States Attorney’s Office
and the Securities and Exchange Commission investigated Gupta’s
ties to the insider trading scheme of leaking boardroom secrets to
Rajaratnam.17 Additionally, the court explained that Gupta had already
been convicted of conspiring with Rajaratnam to commit securities
fraud.18
In its request for restitution, Goldman Sachs provided the court with
542 pages worth of billing records that specified the work performed
by the firm of Sullivan & Cromwell LLP “with sufficient particularity
to assess what was done, how it was done, and why it was done.”19
The court allowed Goldman Sachs to recover for the “fees incurred
during its participation in the parallel SEC cases against Gupta and its
fees incurred in connection with this case during the pendency of the
criminal prosecution of [Rajaratnam],”20 but identified and excluded
a number of entries. The court excluded ten percent of the requested
restitution and ordered Gupta to pay Goldman Sachs over $6.2
million.21 In his decision, Judge Rakoff did not discuss or even mention
the legislature’s intent to allow corporations to benefit as victims under
the MVRA. Rather, Judge Rakoff’s decision relied on settled precedent
within the Second Circuit allowing corporations to recover for these
types of expenses (i.e. attorney’s fees and internal investigation costs)
and on this basis ruled in favor of Goldman Sachs under the MVRA.
Like Goldman Sachs, numerous other corporations have been
Non Party the Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of its Req. for Restitution
at 2.
14
18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii)–(c)(1)(B) (Supp. 2012).
15
Gupta, 2013 WL 662954 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2013).
16
18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(4) (Supp. 2012).
17
See Gupta, 848 F. Supp. 2d at 491; Rajaratnam, 822 F. Supp. 2d at 432.
18
See Gupta, 848 F. Supp. 2d at 491.
19
Gupta, 2013 WL 662954 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2013).
20
Id. (referring to SEC civil proceeding, Rajaratnam, 822 F. Supp. 2d at 432).
21
Id.
13
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plagued with insider trading schemes and directors or employees who
fail to abide by securities laws, such as the case illustrated above.22
Corporations usually have agreements with directors and employees
that bind the corporation to advance attorney fees to the director and
employee if he or she were to become the subject of a government
investigation or a defendant in civil and/or criminal proceedings.
However, the corporation must also expend its own company
resources (i.e. time spent by other directors, employees, and staff) as
well as monetary resources in seeking legal advice for its own internal
investigations, obtaining legal representation for its cooperation with
the authorities conducting those government investigations, and
pursuing related civil and/or criminal proceedings.23
As a result of this use of corporate resources, which may result
from misconduct of a director or employee, corporations have been
requesting restitution to recover as “victims” under the MVRA.24
However, the MVRA does not specifically define a “victim” as including
a corporation, but rather uses the term “person.”25 When interpreting
congressional statutes, if a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts will
interpret the statute according to its plain meaning since it is a better
indicator of Congress’ intent.26 However, when a statute is ambiguous,
that is, when it has two or more plausible alternative readings, courts
may resort to the legislative history in order to give effect to Congress’
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Charges DenverBased Insurance Executive with Insider Trading (Oct. 26, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2012/2012-217.htm (charging insurance company CEO with insider trading based on
information he obtained regarding a firm’s acquisition of stock in a company); Press Release,
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Charges Oil Company CEO as Source in Insider
Trading Case (Nov. 28, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-243.htm
(charging CEO of an oil and gas company with insider trading for leaking confidential information
to an insurance executive who traded on that information); see also United States v. Anderson, 533
F.3d 623, 626 (8th Cir. 2008) (charging a CEO and chairman of board of directors of company with
insider trading and money laundering of his stock in the company); United States v. Falcone, 97
F. Supp. 2d 297, 298 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (convicting a securities broker with insider trading under a
misappropriation theory from acquiring contents of a business magazine column, Business Week,
from an employee of McGraw-Hill Company before it was published).
23
There is a separate and related case for indemnification against Raj Rajaratnam, however, that
topic is beyond the scope of this paper. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 2012 WL 362031 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 31, 2012).
24
See United States v. Skowron, 839 F. Supp. 2d 740 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); United States v. Bahel, 662
F.3d 610 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Hosking, 567 F.3d 329, 332 (7th Cir. 2009); United States
v. Elson, 577 F.3d 713 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Amato, 540 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2008); United
States v. Ojeikere, 545 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Donaghy, 570 F. Supp. 2d 411, 431
(E.D.N.Y. 2008); United States v. DeRosier, 501 F.3d 888 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. Phillips,
477 F.3d 215, 224 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Beaird, 145 F. App’x 853 (5th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Gordon, 393 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Cummings, 281 F.3d 1046,
1051–53 (9th Cir. 2002).
25
18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2) (Supp. 2012).
26
See, e.g., United States v. Quarrell, 310 F.3d 664, 669 (10th Cir. 2002) (construing the MVRA as
applying to the government).
22
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intent.27
When it enacted the statute, did Congress consider corporations
to be “victims” entitled to restitution under the MVRA? This answer
has not been provided or discussed by existing case law applying the
MVRA. This article answers this question. In addition, it highlights
the possible issues a judge may encounter in the application and
interpretation of the MVRA, the current use of the MVRA by
corporations, and offers potential defenses a defendant could employ
in challenging a corporate giant’s restitution request. Additionally,
I discuss several policy arguments justifying the application of the
MVRA to corporations as well those arguments that oppose it. Finally,
I conclude with a discussion on the restitution the MVRA may provide
to shareholders who qualify as victims under the statute.
I. The Enactments of the VWPA and the MVRA
Until 1982, a “victim’s only option [to obtain monetary compensation
for a crime] was to file a separate civil suit.”28 In 1982, Congress passed
the Victim and Witness Protection Act (“VWPA”).29 This statute gave
federal courts discretion on whether or not to order restitution to victims
for crimes covered under the statute. Additionally, when calculating
restitution amounts, a federal court could consider the defendant’s
economic circumstances, such as financial resources, needs, earning
ability, and whether or not the defendant had dependents.30
However, many courts have not ordered restitution, even though
it was within their authority to do so under the VWPA.31 In some
cases, even when the court provided victims with restitution, victims
were not adequately compensated for the crime that was committed.32
See United States v. Boccagna, 450 F.3d 107, 114 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Only if we conclude that [the
MVRA’s] statutory language is ambiguous ‘do we resort . . . to canons of construction and, if
the meaning [still] remains ambiguous, to legislative history.’”) (quoting Daniel v. Am. Bd. of
Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408, 422 (2d Cir. 2005)); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (indicating that the court’s purpose is to give effect to the intent
of Congress).
28
Matthew Spohn, A Statutory Chameleon: The Mandatory Victim Restitution Act’s Challenge to the
Civil/Criminal Divide, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 1013, 1014 (2001) (discussing the history of the VWPA and
MVRA).
29
18 U.S.C. § 3663 (2006).
30
18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(B)(i)(II) (2006).
31
See 141 Cong. Rec. S19273, S19277 (daily ed. Dec. 22 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“[T]he
overwhelming sentiment in the legislature was that the rate at which the federal judiciary was
imposing restitution was ‘simply not enough.’”). See also S. Rep. 104-179, at 13 (1995), reprinted in
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 926, where Senator Hatch explains that in 1994 “[f]ederal [c]ourts ordered
restitution in only 20.2 percent of criminal cases.” (citing United States Sentencing Commission
Annual Report 1994, tbl.22).
32
See H.R. Rep. 104-16, at 4 (1995). See also S. Rep. 104-179, at 18 (1995), reprinted in 1996
27
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In the House Report on Victim Restitution Act of 1995 (the “House
Report”), the Committee on the Judiciary discussed that the court is to
determine restitution based on the full amount of the victim’s losses.33
The Committee stated that, “[u]nder existing law, crime victims’ rights
[we]re still too often overlooked. Even though the law provides the
means to address the rights of victims, the [VWPA] does not, however,
provide for a means to make victims whole.”34 Thus, a victim provided
with restitution under the VWPA was not adequately compensated
since he was not made whole by not receiving the full amount “that [he
or she] is due.”35
Crime victims’ rights were no longer overlooked when, in 1996,
Congress passed the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996
(“MVRA”).36 “When the 1996 Act [(the MVRA)] was enacted, Congress
took a wide range of crimes and moved them from being covered
under the permissive 1982 Act [(VWPA)] to being covered under the
mandatory 1996 Act.”37 The MVRA removed the discretionary power
of the court in imposing restitution and made it mandatory “to those
Federal offenses in which an identifiable victim suffers physical injury
or a pecuniary loss.”38 Under the MVRA, the “victim” must be “directly
and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of an offense for
which restitution may be ordered[.]”39 Additionally, under the MVRA,
a judge can no longer fashion the restitution order by considering the
U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 931. (“It is essential that the criminal justice system recognize the impact that
crime has on the victim, and, to the extent possible, ensure that offender be held accountable to
repay these costs.”); see also Matthew Dickman, Should Crime Pay?: A Critical Assessment of the
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, 97 Cal. L. Rev. 1687, 1690–91 (2009) (“Congress’ view
that judges were deficiently imposing restitution corresponded with its assessment that victims
of crime were being inadequately compensated. Accordingly, a primary impetus behind the
enactment of the MVRA was the desire to better recompense victims.”).
33
H.R. Rep. 104-16, at 4 (1995).
34
Id.
35
S. Rep. 104-179, at 12 (1995).
36
S. Rep. 104-179, at 13 (1995). (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“[W]hile significant strides have been
made since 1982 toward a more victim-centered justice system, much progress remains to be
made in the area of victim restitution.”).
37
Sarah N. Welling, Restitution, 3 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Crim. § 546 (4th ed. 2012).
38
S. Rep. 104-179, at 18 (1995); see also S. Rep. 104-179, at 12 (1995) (“Crimes for which mandatory
restitution would apply include crimes of violence, felony crime against property (including
crimes committed by fraud or deceit), product tampering, and certain drug crimes.”).
39
18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2) (Supp. 2012). Several circuit cases have shed light on what the
terms “direct and proximate harm” require to show a causal connection under the MVRA. In
United States v. Speakman, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated that
the government must show that the defendant’s conduct is the “but-for” cause of the victim’s
direct harm and that the defendant proximately caused the harm. 594 F.3d 1165, 1171 (10th Cir.
2010). The court went on to discuss how other circuits have interpreted the causal requirement
under the MVRA and other federal statutes such as the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the
causal requirement under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act “[encompassing] the traditional ‘but for’
and proximate cause analyses.” Id. (quoting In re Antrobus, 519 F.3d 1123, 1126 (10th Cir. 2008)
(citation omitted)).
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defendant’s financial circumstances,40 but instead the defendant has
to pay the full amount of the victim’s losses. However, the judge can
consider the defendant’s financial resources in determining a schedule
or paying the restitution.41 Moreover, to prevent overreaching, the
restitution order must be limited to losses “from the specific offense for
which the defendant was indicted and convicted.”42 “The MVRA and
VWPA do not overlap. [The] MVRA makes restitution mandatory for
the crimes it covers, and the VWPA [allows] discretionary restitution for
non-MVRA crimes [it covers].”43
II. The Purpose of Restitution Under the
MVRA—A Civil or Criminal Penalty?
Both the House and Senate Reports on the bill in its initial stages
shed light on Congress’ intended purpose for the MVRA. The MVRA,
known in its beginning stages as the H.R. 665 bill, passed the House
of Representatives on February 7, 1995. This bill made restitution
mandatory in all federal criminal cases. In the House Report, Senator
McCollum, from the Committee on the Judiciary, stated that the purpose
of the bill “is to ensure that criminals pay full restitution to their victims
for all damages caused as a result of the crime.”44 Thus, as explained
earlier, it seems that the primary motivation in enacting the MVRA
was the belief that the VWPA “had not adequately compensated crime
victims.”45
After passing the House, the bill proceeded for review by the Senate.
In the Senate Report, Senator Hatch stated that the current bill “would
not address the inconsistencies arising from various congressional
enactments since 1982.”46 The stated purpose of the MVRA given in
the Senate Report was “to improve the administration of justice in
Federal criminal cases by requiring Federal criminal defendants to pay
full restitution to the identifiable victims of their crimes.”47 Thus, the
purpose of the MVRA is to make the victim whole based on the wrongs
committed by a defendant.48 But, does this mean that the purpose of the
18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A) (Supp. 2012).
18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2) (Supp. 2012).
42
United States v. Gordon, 480 F.3d 1205, 1211 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Fogg,
409 F.3d 1022, 1028 (8th Cir. 2005)).
43
United States v. Battista, 575 F.3d 226, 231 n.3 (2d Cir. 2009) (“See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1)(A)
(excluding from the VWPA ‘offense[s] described in section 3663A(c).’)”).
44
H.R. Rep. 104-16, at 4 (1995).
45
Matthew Dickman, Should Crime Pay?: A Critical Assessment of the Mandatory Victims Restitution
Act of 1996, 97 Calif. L. Rev. 1687, 1689 (2009) (citing H.R. Rep. 104-16, at 4 (1995)).
46
S. Rep. 104-179, at 14 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 928.
47
S. Rep. 104-179, at 12 (1995).
48
See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 393 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The primary and
overarching goal of the MVRA is to make victims of crime whole.”).
40
41
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MVRA is civil in nature or criminal in nature?49
While courts have split on this exact issue, those cases mostly
revolve around whether or not an application of the MVRA to offenses
committed prior to its adoption would violate the ex post facto clause
of the United States Constitution. If a statute’s purpose were civil in
nature, rather than punitive, then there would be no violation of the ex
post facto clause. However, even if the legislature intended the statute as
a civil one, if the statutory scheme is so punitive, either in purpose or
effect, that it negates the legislature’s intent, then the statute violates
the ex post facto clause.50 The majority of circuits have determined that an
order of restitution under a federal statute like the MVRA, in a criminal
case, does violate the ex post facto clause when applied to offenses
committed prior to its adoption since the proceeding is criminal in
nature.51 However, if the offense was a conspiracy, restitution under
the MVRA could be ordered “before and after the effective date of
the MVRA[.]”52 The Seventh Circuit and Tenth Circuit have been in
the minority among the circuits and have held that the ex post facto
clause does not apply to restitution under the MVRA because it is not a
criminal penalty.53
For the purposes of this article, I am refraining from the application of the ex post facto clause
statutory analysis and simply providing the majority and minority views of the circuits, which
have applied the test and analysis seen in United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248–49 (1980). See
Matthew Spohn’s A Statutory Chameleon: The Mandatory Victim Restitution Act’s Challenge to the
Civil/Criminal Divide, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 1013, 1026 (2001), for a complete review on the application
of the Ward test by the courts in reaching the majority and minority views.
50
Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying the MVRA, but discussing ex post
facto analysis regarding a twenty-fourth amendment claim).
51
See United States v. Leahy, 438 F.3d 328, 334–35 (3d Cir. 2006) (expressing agreement with
Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits); United States v. Edwards, 162 F.3d 87, 91 (3d
Cir. 1998) (“[L]egislative history also evinces a Congressional intent to . . . make mandatory
restitution under the MVRA a penalty separate from civil remedies available to the victims of
crime; and . . . to ensure that restitution under the MVRA is a form of criminal penalty rather
than civil redress.”); United States v. Elson, 577 F.3d 713, 721 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Schulte, 264 F.3d 656 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Williams, 128 F.3d 1239, 1241–42 (8th Cir.
1997); United States v. Montgomery, 384 F.3d 1050, 1064 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Baggett,
125 F.3d 1319, 1320–21 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Siegel, 153 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 1998);
United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
52
See, e.g., United States v. Grice, 319 F.3d 1174, 1177 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v.
Kubick, 205 F.3d 1117, 1128–29 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying MVRA to a conspiracy to commit
bankruptcy fraud)).
53
See United States v. Wells, 177 F. 3d 603 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding that restitution does not qualify
as punishment); United States v. Newman, 144 F.3d 531 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that Congress did
not indicate a preference for either a civil or criminal statute and that the MVRA did not have a
punitive effect); United States v. Visinaiz, 428 F.3d 1300 (10th Cir. 2005) (applying the MVRA to
a murder prosecution case and finding that restitution did not qualify as a criminal punishment,
thus, a jury determination under the Sixth Amendment was not required); see also 22 Mandatory
Restitution to Victims of Certain Crimes, 9A Fed. Proc., L. Ed. § 1694 (2012) (citing United States v.
Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255, 1279 (10th Cir. 1999) (also finding that restitution does not qualify as
punishment)).
49
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Even with this split among the circuits, neither Congress nor the
Supreme Court of the United States has clarified or decided the nature
of the restitution afforded by the MVRA. The circuits have petitioned
the Supreme Court of the United States asking for guidance. For
example, the Third Circuit petitioned for a writ of certiorari addressing
the circuits’ splintered view, but the Court denied it.54 Thereafter,
the Seventh Circuit filed a petition with the Supreme Court and, in
its first question, explicitly stated the Circuit’s view of the restitution
imposed under the MVRA as civil in nature and requested an answer
on whether or not the Circuit’s view was in error.55 More precisely,
the petition’s initial question stated, “Did the Seventh Circuit err in
holding, in conflict with eight other circuits and this Court’s decision
in Pasquantino v. United States,56 that restitution imposed as part of a
criminal sentence under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act is a
“civil penalty?”57 The Court also denied this petition.
There is further evidence of Congress’ intent for the MVRA to serve
as a criminal statute in the placement of the statute under “Crimes and
Criminal Procedure” in Title 18 of the United States Code. Additionally,
Rule 32(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was also amended
to apply to proceedings relating to the issuance of restitution orders.58
However, a statute’s placement in the criminal code is not dispositive.59
In sum and substance, whether it is a criminal or civil penalty, under
the MVRA, restitution is awarded in federal proceedings as a separate
part of a criminal sentence that is meant to compensate the victim of a
crime and make the victim financially whole. Regardless of whether a
court deems the statute as criminal or civil in nature, it can be argued
that a corporation that has become the victim of a crime should be able
See Dantone, Inc. v. United States, 2006 WL 1994675 (U.S.) (“Whether restitution, which the
Third Circuit sitting en banc below unanimously held was a criminal penalty (joining the Fifth,
Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits, but in direct conflict with the Seventh and Tenth
Circuits), nonetheless falls outside the ambit of Booker, Blakely, Ring, and Apprendi (as a fractured
7 to 5 majority of the Third Circuit en banc held below).”).
55
See Bonner v. United States, 2008 WL 2773353 (U.S.) (“If the answer to the first Question
Presented is ‘yes,’ did the Seventh Circuit err in concluding, in conflict with this Court’s decisions
in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2004), that the Sixth Amendment did not entitle petitioners to a jury
trial on the amount of restitution?”).
56
544 U.S. 349 (2005). In Pasquantino v. United States, the Supreme Court described the purpose
of a restitution award under the MVRA in the case before the Court as “[necessary to] mete out
appropriate criminal punishment for that conduct.” 544 U.S. at 365.
57
See Bonner, 2008 WL 2773353 (U.S.) and accompanying text in note 51.
58
S. Rep. 104-179, at 12 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 925 (“[Bill] has the further
purpos[e] of establishing one set of procedures for the issuance of restitution orders in Federal
criminal cases, and of consolidating the procedures for the collection of unpaid restitution with
existing procedures for the collection of unpaid fines[.]”).
59
See United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 363–64 (1984).
54

224

Did Congress Intend For Corporations To
Benefit From The MVRA?

to recover from the wrongdoer for those losses the wrongdoer cost the
corporation. This is in accord with the legislature’s view that “[i]t is
essential that the criminal justice system recognize the impact that crime
has on the victim, and, to the extent possible, ensure that the offender
be held accountable to repay these costs.”60 The offender would have
“to face the harm suffered by his victim[] and, to others harmed by his
unlawful actions.”61 In light of the purpose of the MVRA to make the
victim whole, if the corporation suffered a “pecuniary loss”62 from an
offense that is covered under the MVRA, then the corporation would
and should be entitled to mandatory restitution. However, does a
corporation fit within the definition of “victim” as expressed by the
statute?
III. Who is A Victim By the Terms in the
MVRA and Does a Corporation Fit?
In the Senate Report, the Committee on the Judiciary began the
Discussion section by stating, “each year 25% of U.S. households are
victimized by one or more crimes.”63 The Report goes on to discuss
how people can become victims of such violent crimes with some
injuries requiring medical attention, treatment, and stay at a hospital.64
This discussion does not mention corporations as victims of crime, but
rather focuses on individuals and U.S. households. Moreover, in the
Legislative History section, Senator Hatch emphasizes the minimal
amount of restitution ordered in murders, kidnappings, robberies, and
sexual abuse cases.65
The legislative history does not offer any suggestion that at the
time the bill passed Congress thought about whether a corporation
would be able to recover under the MVRA. Rather, it seems there
was a concern for victims of violent crimes such as those listed in the
Report. Although the Committee used the term “corporation” in the
Senate Report, the Committee was referring to corporations convicted
of federal felonies themselves and the need for them to contribute to
the Crime Victims Fund.66
In looking at the statutory language, the MVRA defines
S. Rep. 104-179, at 18 (1995).
H.R. Rep. 104-16 at 5 (1995).
62
18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(B) (Supp. 2012).
63
S. Rep. 104-179, at 17 (1995).
64
Id.
65
S. Rep. 104-179, at 13 (1995).
66
S. Rep. 104-179, at 29 (1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy). In 1984, Congress created the Crime
Victims Fund to be funded with fines and penalties paid by persons convicted of federal crimes.
The Fund provides for federal assistance to state and local crime victims.
60
61
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the term “victim” as:
a person directly and proximately harmed as a result
of the commission of an offense for which restitution
may be ordered including, in the case of an offense that
involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern
of criminal activity, any person directly harmed by the
defendant’s criminal conduct in the course of the scheme,
conspiracy, or pattern. In the case of a victim who is under
18 years of age, incompetent, incapacitated, or deceased,
the legal guardian of the victim or representative of the
victim’s estate, another family member, or any other
person appointed as suitable by the court, may assume
the victim’s rights under this section, but in no event
shall the defendant be named as such representative or
guardian.67
In using the term “person,” the Legislature has provided some
guidance on interpreting the term when used within any act of Congress.
“[U]nless the context indicates otherwise[,] . . . the word[] ‘person’ . . .
include[s] corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships,
societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals[.]”68 Thus,
since not indicated otherwise in the statute or legislative history of
the MVRA, the term “corporation” does fit within the definition of
“person” set forth by Congress.69 Further, the Supreme Court has
instructed that, “it is well understood that corporations should be
treated as natural persons for virtually all purposes of constitutional
and statutory analysis.”70
Accordingly, if a corporation proves a causal connection as an
identifiable victim (within the definition provided by the legislature
in the MVRA) to a crime covered under the statute, such as fraud or
deceit,71 it may be entitled to restitution if it has suffered a pecuniary
loss.72 A corporation may not qualify as a victim entitled to restitution,
18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2) (Supp. 2012) (emphasis added).
1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
69
See Catharine M. Goodwin, The Imposition of Restitution in Federal Criminal Cases, 62 Fed.
Probation 95 (1998) (stating that that even though the VWPA refers to victims as “persons” the
federal code includes corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and
joint stock companies as “persons” and restitution is ordered for these entities frequently).
70
Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 667 (1979) (citing Monell v. New York City Dept.
of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 687 (1978)).
71
18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii) (Supp. 2012). There are also Title 18 crimes related to fraud that
affect financial institutions, which involve corporations: 18 U.S.C. § 1344 on bank fraud and 18
U.S.C. § 1348 on securities and commodities fraud.
72
18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(B) (Supp. 2012).
67
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however, when it has taken part in the offense for which the defendant
was convicted or was a co-conspirator.73 Many corporations have
become aware of the beneficial application of the MVRA to protect a
corporation’s resources, but what exactly can the corporation recover?
IV. Recent Trend in Corporations
Recovering Under § 3663A(b)(4)
Even if a corporation does qualify as a “victim” within the meaning
of the MVRA, the legislature made sure to provide for restitution for only
certain offenses and certain costs. Thus, those opposed to corporations
collecting under the MVRA can gain some comfort in the fact that the
recent trend has allowed corporations to recover only for legal fees,
accounting costs, and investigative costs.74 Moreover, speculative losses
or losses “in which the victim’s loss is not clearly causally linked to the
offense” are not subject to mandatory restitution.75
Courts have either granted or denied a corporation’s restitution
request of attorney’s fees, accounting costs, and investigative costs
through two provisions within the MVRA. The first provision, 18
U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(1), requires a court to order restitution “in the case
of an offense resulting in damage to or loss or destruction of property
of a victim of the offense[.]”76 Courts have denied restitution requests
by corporations, under subsection (b)(1), finding these costs to be
consequential damages and not “damage to or loss or destruction of
property,” and thus, prohibited under this provision of the MVRA.77
However, courts have awarded attorney’s fees, accounting costs,
and investigative costs based upon another MVRA provision, 18 U.S.C
§ 3663A(b)(4), which states that the defendant will be required to
See, e.g., United States v. Ojeikere, 545 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2008).
See United States v. Bahel, 662 F.3d 610 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that attorney’s fees can be
properly included as “other expenses”); United States v. Battista, 575 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2009)
(allowing the NBA to recover restitution of attorney’s fees and accounting costs resulting from
the NBA’s assisting the government in the investigation and prosecution of a referee-defendant
involved in a conspiracy to transmit wagering information); United States v. DeRosier, 501 F.3d 888
(8th Cir. 2007) (holding that a restitution award including bank attorney’s fees and investigative
costs based on defendant’s conviction of wire fraud is appropriate where losses are caused by the
defendant’s fraudulent conduct and it is reasonable and foreseeable that a bank would investigate
the defendant’s conduct); United States v. Beaird, 145 F. App’x 853 (5th Cir. 2005) (awarding a
corporation attorney’s fees and litigation expenses for their assistance to the FBI regarding wire
fraud and aiding and abetting crimes).
75
S. Rep. 104-179, at 19 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 932.
76
18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(1) (Supp. 2012).
77
See United States v. Piggie, 303 F.3d 923, 928 (8th Cir. 2002) (awarding attorney’s fees using
§ 3663A(b)(4) and explaining that § 3663A(b)(1), precludes an award of such damages); see also
United States v. Onyiego, 286 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that attorney’s fees are consequential
damages under § 3663A(b)(1) and thus barred from restitution order).
73
74
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provide restitution to the victim for “necessary . . . and other expenses
incurred during participation in the investigation or prosecution of
the offense or [the victim’s] attendance” at proceedings related to the
offense.78 Under this provision, corporations must submit proof of
attorney’s fees, accounting costs, and investigative costs to the court,
and the judge,79 in determining the restitution order, reviews such
evidence under a preponderance of the evidence standard.80
Despite the legislature’s limitation of mandatory restitution to
certain offenses and costs, those opposed to corporations collecting
under the MVRA may argue that corporations should still not be
entitled to restitution. Corporations can already shelter themselves
from overpaying for a director’s or employee’s misconduct through
purchasing insurance. However, even though “[m]any insurance
policies do provide coverage for costs associated with class action and
other litigation[,] . . . [they] do not cover investigations, particularly
those that have not reached a formal stage.”81 Despite this, courts have
expressed disagreement on whether or not to include costs for internal
investigations in a restitution order.
Internal investigation costs are costs for investigations by a
corporation or employer, performed internally rather than costs related
to providing assistance to government investigations. The Second,
Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have taken a broader view
under § 3663A(b)(4) and have awarded corporations and institutions
restitution for their internal investigations as “necessary” expenses.82
Subsection (b)(4) highlights that costs awarded under this section
should be for those “investigations” occurring “during” the participation
18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(4) (Supp. 2012).
See, e.g., United States v. Hosking, 567 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[S]pecific findings of fact
reflected in the record still are necessary at times and contemplates that district courts provide an
explanation of their reasoning, supported by articulated findings of fact.” (quoting United States
v. Menza, 137 F.3d 533, 538 (7th Cir. 1998))). The court in Hosking dealt with applying the VWPA.
However, courts can rely on cases that apply the VWPA as precedent in interpreting the MVRA.
See United States v. Gordon, 393 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Randle, 324
F.3d 550, 555–56 & nn.2–3 (7th Cir. 2003)).
80
18 U.S.C. § 3664(e) (2012).
81
Recovering Leal Fees and Costs Through Criminal Restitution, White Collar Crime Rep. (BNA) No.
4, at D-39 (Jan. 16, 2009).
82
See Amato, 540 F.3d at 153; United States v. Phillips, 477 F.3d 215, 224 (5th Cir. 2007); Hosking,
567 F.3d at 332; United States v. Gordon, 393 F.3d 1044, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that there was
no abuse in discretion in a district court’s restitution order including investigation costs incurred
by employer in connection with an embezzlement of a corporation’s stock holdings when those
costs were in response to grand jury subpoenas and government requests to analyze documents)
(citing Cummings, 281 F.3d at 1051–53 (holding that corporation was entitled to restitution for the
losses sustained in refilling financial statements that were originally manipulated by a partner
who attempted to conceal an under accrual)); Piggie, 303 F.3d at 928 (awarding four universities
restitution for the investigations it performed on student athletes).
78
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or prosecution of an offense. Some circuits favor a broader view in
interpreting the terms “during” and “investigation.” For example, the
Second Circuit takes such a broad view and includes those investigative
costs incurred both prior and subsequent to the government’s
involvement.83 In United States v. Amato, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the defendants were liable
for their employer’s attorney’s fees, including internal investigative
costs, and accounting costs related to the defendants’ mail and wire
fraud conspiracy.84 Amato was one of the first cases ordering mandatory
restitution stemming from a white-collar crime under subsection (b)
(4) instead of subsection (b)(1).85 Under Amato, investigative expenses
including internal investigations can be included in restitution orders
as long as they are “necessary.”86 This was the case in United States v.
Skowron, where a defendant was convicted of a conspiracy to commit
securities fraud and obstruction of an SEC investigation.87 In that case,
the court also awarded the corporation costs for the corporation’s
launch of its own internal investigation.88
On the other hand, other courts assume that the term “investigation”
refers only to government investigations and those expenses incurred
for the “purpose of assisting” the government in the investigation
and prosecution of an offense.89 For example, the D.C. Circuit has
taken a narrow view of § 3663A(b)(4) and has made clear that it will
not include internal investigation costs as part of a restitution order.
In United States v. Papagno, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia held that costs of an internal investigation were
not necessary expenses since criminal investigators or prosecutors did
not request it or require it.90 The court went further and clarified its
holding by stating that even if an internal investigation was required
by a criminal investigator or prosecutor, those expenses may still not be
considered “necessary” and therefore, may not be awarded.91
See, e.g., Gupta, 2013 WL 662954 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2013).
Amato, 540 F.3d at 162–163.
85
See White Collar Crime Report, supra note 70.
86
See Gupta, 2013 WL 662954 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2013).
87
839 F. Supp. 2d 740 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
88
Id. (also awarding costs associated with responding to the SEC investigation and providing for
defense of defendant and other employees).
89
See United States v. Donaghy, 570 F. Supp. 2d 411, 431 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) aff’d sub nom. United
States v. Battista, 575 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2009); United States v. Norman Goldstein, M.D., Inc., 2008
WL 659676 (D. Haw. Mar. 11, 2008) (holding that internal investigations not performed with the
purpose of assisting the government are consequential damages and should not be awarded);
United States v. Bogart, 490 F. Supp. 2d 885 (S.D. Ohio 2007) aff’d, 576 F.3d 565 (6th Cir. 2009), aff’d
sub nom. United States v. Elson, 577 F.3d 713 (6th Cir. 2009) (same).
90
639 F.3d 1093, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
91
Id. at 1100.
83
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There are justifications for granting a corporation’s request for
restitution of costs associated with an internal investigation. For
example, corporations often share results from internal investigations
with government agencies when assisting them with the prosecution
of an offense. Thus, the corporation would be participating in a
government’s investigation of the defendant’s wrongful conduct
when it shares such results. Further, these prior internal investigation
results would be necessary to the government’s later investigation and
prosecution. “It seems unjustifiable to deny restitution simply because
a corporation found necessary information before the government
formally requested it.”92
V. Possible Problems in a Judge’s Application
of 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(4)
When applying § 3663A(b)(4), a judge may need to tackle several
troubling issues. These issues revolve around a judge’s interpretation
and ultimate determination as to what is considered “necessary,” a
judge’s evidentiary review of a corporation’s requested costs, and a
judge’s role as a fact-finder in fashioning restitution orders.
A. What is Necessary?
There seems to be yet another circuit split in the assessment of
what is considered “necessary” under the MVRA when awarding costs
under § 3663A(b)(4). The statute does not provide any direction on
what “necessary” includes and thus leaves the interpretation of this
term up to the courts.
The MVRA removed the discretionary power of the judge in
awarding restitution in certain cases and made it mandatory.93
However, the judge may exercise discretion in determining the amount
of restitution owed to a victim.94 Accordingly, the judge exercises this
discretion when assessing what other necessary expenses should be
included in a restitution order. Moreover, although the government
has the burden of proving these expenses by a preponderance of the
evidence,95 the defendant has the burden to disprove what expenses
are not necessary. The defendant must research the split between the
circuits, choose and argue a favorable case precedent, and, if the court
See White Collar Crime Report, supra note 70.
See S. Rep. 104-179, at 18 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 931.
94
See H.R. Rep. 104-16, at 4 (1995); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a) (Supp. 2012) (“For orders of
restitution under this title, the court shall order the probation officer to obtain and include in its
presentence report, or in a separate report, as the court may direct, information sufficient for the
court to exercise its discretion in fashioning a restitution order.”).
95
18 U.S.C. § 3664(e) (Supp. 2012).
92
93
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grants a restitution order in favor of the corporation, appeal the order.
If a defendant appeals an order arguing that the amount ordered is
excessive, then a district court’s restitution order will be reviewed
for abuse of discretion. However, a district’s court’s legal conclusions
underlying a restitution order will be reviewed de novo, and its factual
findings for clear error (i.e. a district court’s interpretation of the
MVRA).96
Some courts have not developed any definition of what “necessary”
includes. In United States v. Donaghy, the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York awarded attorney’s fees after determining
that the corporation in fact paid the fees and incurred them for the
purpose of assisting the government in the investigation and prosecution
of an offense.97 The court did not seem to delve into any further review
of what “necessary” really means for the corporation and the costs it
wishes to recover. The Fifth and Eighth Circuits have not offered or
applied any test and rather have awarded costs under § 3663A(b)(4)
based on the fact that they are not considered consequential damages,
which are prohibited under § 3663A(b)(1).98 Additionally, the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Amato stated that
the court had previously upheld the inclusion of lost income as other
necessary expenses under § 3663A(b)(4) “without considering whether
[the] loss was a direct and foreseeable result of the defendant’s offense.”99
The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, has added an additional causal
requirement when interpreting these expenses under § 3663A(b)(4)
aside from the one used to identify who is a victim under § 3663A(a)(2).
The Ninth Circuit holds that a judge must carefully analyze whether the
expenses were a direct and foreseeable result of the defendant’s wrongful
actions.100

See United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1256 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Marino, 654
F.3d 310, 316 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Higuera–Llamos, 574 F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir. 2009);
Amato, 540 F.3d at 158; Ojeikere, 545 F.3d at 222; United States v. Barton, 366 F.3d 1160, 1164–65
(10th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Quarrell, 310 F.3d 664, 676–78 (10th Cir. 2002)).
97
570 F. Supp. 2d 411, 431 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
98
See, e.g., United States v. Onyiego, 286 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that attorney’s fees are
consequential damages under § 3663A(b)(1) and thus barred from a restitution order).
99
Amato, 540 F.3d at 162 (citing United States v. Douglas, 525 F.3d 225, 254 (2d Cir. 2008)).
100
See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 393 F.3d 1044, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that there was
no abuse of discretion in a district court’s restitution order including investigation costs incurred
by employer in connection with an embezzlement of a corporation’s stock holdings when those
costs were in response to grand jury subpoenas and government requests to analyze documents)
(citing Cummings, 281 F.3d at 1051–53 (holding that corporation was entitled to restitution for the
losses sustained in refilling financial statements that were originally manipulated by a partner
who attempted to conceal an under accrual)).
96
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B. Judge’s Review of the Evidence
As stated earlier, corporations can submit proof of attorney’s fees,
accounting costs, and investigative costs to support the request for a
restitution order. A heavy burden rests upon the defendant in rebutting
the evidence offered to the judge.
Under the MVRA, the judge reviews the evidentiary proof to
determine the amount of restitution under a preponderance of the
evidence standard.101 After a court convicts and sentences a defendant,
a court then has ninety days after the date of sentencing to fashion the
restitution order.102 Given the ninety-day time constraint, the parties—
and most importantly the judge—have a limited time in which to review
the evidence provided by the parties in addition to the memoranda
in support or in opposition to the restitution request. The defendant
must review the billing or accounting records of the corporation or law
firm and point out what is not a necessary expense and thus excludable
from the restitution order. How well, given the court’s docket size,
can a judge review hundreds of pages of records within such a short
amount of time?103
Given all of these factors, there is a margin for error by the judge in
evaluating the evidence provided by the parties. In interpreting billing
or accounting records, the judge (and also the defendant) may not be
familiar with the corporation’s or law firm’s practices in maintaining
and accurately documenting their records.104 How then can a defendant
18 U.S.C. § 3664(e) (Supp. 2012) (“Any dispute as to the proper amount or type of restitution
shall be resolved by the court by the preponderance of the evidence.”).
102
18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5) (Supp. 2012). But see Alexander J. Sisemore, Straying from the Written
Path: How the Supreme Court Eviscerated the Plain Meaning of the Mvra’s Ninety-Day Deadline
Provision and Legislated from the Bench in Dolan v. United States, 64 Okla. L. Rev. 211, 223 (2012)
(citing Dolan v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2533, 2539 (2010)) (discussing Dolan where the Court
decided that the MVRA’s ninety-day deadline “is a speed-seeking deadline and that when the
deadline is missed, the court retains the power to order restitution pursuant to the MVRA.”); see
also Beth Bates Holliday, Annotation, Who Is a “Victim” Entitled to Restitution Under the Mandatory
Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A), 26 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 283 (2008) (citing United
States v. Cheal, 389 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2004)) (“The purpose behind the statutory 90-day limit on
the determination of victims’ losses is not to protect defendants from drawn-out sentencing
proceedings or to establish finality, but rather to protect crime victims from the willful dissipation
of defendants’ assets.”).
103
As explained in the introductory paragraphs to this article, Judge Rakoff had to review 542
pages of billing records provided by Goldman Sachs to establish the costs associated with the
legal advice received from Sullivan & Cromwell, LLP. See Gupta, 2013 WL 662954 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
25, 2013).
104
A judge, however, can base a restitution order’s conclusions on “well-recognized industry
standards and norms.” United States v. Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112, 1125 (10th Cir. 2007). In Serawop,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that the United States District
Court for the District of Utah acted within its “abundant discretion” in ordering a defendant
convicted of voluntary manslaughter to pay restitution. 505 F.3d at 1124 (quoting United States v.
101
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be adequately protected?
C. Judge’s Role as the Fact-Finder
Judges must exercise caution in fashioning restitution orders and
specifically point out reasons as to why they are awarding or denying
such costs.105 Thus, this protects the defendant and the judge, if and when
a defendant appeals the order and an appellate court then reviews it.
Judges have shown careful analysis in making these restitution orders
through reducing costs requested by a corporation.106 For example, in
United States v. Gupta, Judge Rakoff identified a small number of entries
that he deemed were not “reasonably necessary under the MVRA”
and thus excludable from the restitution order.107 The court found
that nine percent of the total amount requested by Goldman Sachs
was excludable. In explaining the restitution order, even Judge Rakoff
noted that there was a margin for error in reviewing the evidence and
exhibiting careful fact-finding by increasing the amount excludable
to ten percent.108 Although it was beneficial for the defendant, Judge
Rakoff’s action illustrates the judge’s discretion in determining the
amount of restitution under the MVRA since there was no precedent
cited by the court indicating whether or not the judge could increase
the amount excludable from an order without evidentiary support.
VI. MVRA Use and Application by a
Corporation and a Defendant
Case precedent on the application of the MVRA by corporations
has provided some guidance, although not uniform, as to what factors
should be considered by a corporation in claiming restitution as a
victim under the MVRA and requesting restitution as well as what
defenses a defendant can bring to oppose that request.
Cases have indicated how a corporation can obtain a more
favorable restitution award. For example, if a corporation wishes
to recover for its lost expenses, which may include attorney’s fees,
internal investigations, and auditing costs, incurred as a result of the
Oslund, 453 F.3d 1048, 1063 (8th Cir. 2006)). In determining the amount of restitution, the district
court cross-examined an economist appointed by the court to measure the “victim’s potential
earning capacity” and based its conclusions on “well-recognized industry standards and norms.”
Serawop, 505 F.3d at 1125.
105
See Amato, 540 F.3d 153 and cases discussed in note 79.
106
See Gordon, 393 F.3d at 1057 (analyzing a district court’s findings and finding that there was
a careful analysis of the costs sought since the district court had denied expenses, which were
“extraordinary,” “overlapping,” or “duplicative.”).
107
2013 WL 662954, at *1 (excluding costs relating to post-conviction deposition preparation and
finding number of attorneys staffed on a task was excessive).
108
Id.
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defendant’s wrongful conduct, the corporation should request that the
court order restitution under § 3663A(b)(4) rather than § 3663A(b)(1).
On the other hand, defendants can raise several defenses against
the corporation’s restitution request. For example, the defendant can
claim the requested restitution expenses are not “necessary” under
§ 3663A(b)(4). Also, if attorney’s fees are requested under § 3663A(b)
(1), the defendant can claim these expenses are consequential and
thus barred under the MVRA.109 The defendant can also argue that the
corporation has not provided adequate documentation of the expenses
requested. Further, the defendant can challenge the evidence provided
by the corporation by detailing which expenses should be excluded.
Lastly, a corporation would not be entitled to benefit from the MVRA if
a defendant can prove that the so-called victim corporation was actually
a “perpetrator of the offense of conviction” or a “co-conspirator” and
thus, not entitled to restitution.110
It is worth noting that defendants have also tried, unsuccessfully,
to defend against a corporation’s restitution request for attorney’s fees,
accounting costs, and investigative costs under 18 U.S.C § 3663A(b)(4).
Under this provision, defendants argued that only expenses incurred
for ongoing government investigations or prosecutions can and should
be awarded.111 However, courts have rejected this argument and found
that there was no requirement that a corporation could only receive
restitution for costs incurred as a result of an ongoing investigation.112
VII. Policy Arguments Regarding MVRA
Application to Corporations
A. In Favor of MVRA’s Application to Corporations
The outcome of courts ordering restitution to corporations may
For example, if a defendant is being sued for attorney’s fees in either the Fifth, Seventh, or
Tenth Circuit, under § 3663A(b)(1), the defendant can argue that these costs have been viewed as
consequential damages and thus should be excluded. See Deborah F. Buckman & Kenneth B. Sills,
Annotation, Mandatory Victims Restitution Act—Measure and Elements of Restitution to Which Victim
is Entitled, 51 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 169 (2010) (citing Onyiego, 286 F.3d at 249; Barton, 366 F.3d at 1160;
United States v. Shepard, 269 F.3d 884 (7th Cir. 2001)). However, if a defendant is being sued in the
Second Circuit or Eighth Circuit, attorney’s fees have been awarded under § 3663A(b)(4), where
they are not regarded as consequential. See, e.g., Piggie, 303 F.3d at 928.
110
See Ojeikere, 545 F.3d at 220; United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2006).
111
United States v. Dwyer, 275 F. App’x 269, 272 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Miller,
406 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that only those costs associated
with an ongoing investigation could be recovered: “[t]here is no precedent resolving the question
whether expenses incurred before the government’s investigation were incurred ‘during’ the
investigation for purposes of § 3663A(b)(4)[.]”)).
112
Id.
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indicate judicial approval of the MVRA’s application to corporations.113
The judiciary’s actions may be due to a desire to promote and instill
a cooperative relationship between the private and public sectors.
Additionally, by allowing corporations to benefit from the MVRA, it
creates a societal impact as well as a societal benefit.
Although some courts have provided corporations with restitution
for internal investigative costs not required or requested by the
government, a court will certainly award those costs incurred while
assisting any government agency. These costs include responding to
grand jury subpoenas and document requests, including collecting,
searching, and reviewing documents for document productions,
investigative or pre-trial meetings, and interviews with government
staff. Through granting restitution orders including such costs incurred
by corporations in participating in government investigations, a strong
cooperative relationship forms between corporations and government
lawyers. These orders encourage corporations to provide time,
resources, and assistance to enforcement counsel in the investigation
and prosecution of a defendant’s wrongful conduct. This creates a
relationship between the private and public sector that forms the
foundation for helping current victims of the crime and future victims
of a similar crime.
Congress created the MVRA as a result of increasing awareness of
the impact crimes have upon victims within a society. Thus, Congress
would also not ignore the impact that corporations bring to society.114
Corporations increase economic growth in terms of supplying jobs
and increase social welfare, by providing compensation packages that
include health care, life insurance policies, and retirement pension
plans. Additionally, corporations provide investment vehicles such as
equity, fixed income, or commodities, which investors can purchase
thereby pumping more money into the stock market. Not only does
this serve to stabilize economic growth and provides investors with
higher returns than certificate of deposits at their local banks, but also
the purchase and sale of securities are used as a measure by research
It is possible that the recent trend in the courts application of the MVRA to corporations may
be due to Congress’ inaction in amending the statute in order to exclude corporations and/or the
lack of discussion within the statute’s legislative history. See e.g., Isaacson v. Dow Chemical Co.,
517 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Statutory presumption that the term ‘person’ includes corporations
is not irrebuttable, and it can be overcome where the legislative history of the statute under
consideration shows that the normal rule of construction would run contrary to the statutory
intent.”).
114
See H.R. Rep. 104-16, at 4 (1995); see also S. Rep. 104-179, at 18 (1995), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 931 (“It is essential that the criminal justice system recognize the impact that
crime has on the victim, and, to the extent possible, ensure that offender be held accountable to
repay these costs.”).
113
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analysts to effectively evaluate economic activity and performance.
Corporations also provide for new or improved technology, tools,
and goods used by the public in everyday life at home or in another
profession, which contribute to raising the public’s standard of living.
Lastly, numerous corporations also give back to the community in terms
of creating foundations, which for example, donate to underprivileged
children domestically or internationally, or provide scholarships or
internship programs for individuals of diverse backgrounds. Thus,
these facts demonstrate how corporations provide a great societal
benefit that cannot be ignored.
As a result of the desire to promote a cooperative relationship
between the government and the private sector in addition to the
benefits provided by corporations, a victim corporation should be
allowed to recover under the MVRA for wrongful conduct committed
against it.
B. Disapproval of MVRA’s Application to Corporations
Despite the substantial benefits that corporations provide to society,
there are also some detriments to allowing corporations to benefit under
the MVRA. Although restitution orders may make the corporation
financially whole, such an award may not address a corporation’s
subpar compliance or subpar supervisory procedures that neglected to
alert the corporation to the wrongful conduct and could have avoided
or mitigated the resulting offense.
Through providing restitution for a corporation’s internal
investigations, the MVRA may discourage a corporation’s actions in
taking its own time and resources to create a safe and law-abiding
work environment. Corporations must comply with strict regulations,
especially financial corporations. These regulations include compliance
measures that corporations must take, in order to detect improper
or unusual conduct by an employee committed by phone, email, or
wire that may indicate for example, fraudulent transactions, excessive
trading, or trading after hours, etc. By allowing recovery for internal
investigations of a company’s director or employee, the company is
rewarded for either its mismanagement or subpar supervision of its
employee, or subpar compliance with applicable regulations, which
could have led to the underlying offense. Moreover, a court’s award of
a restitution order that includes costs for internal investigations may
promote higher than necessary costs for internal investigations for
work that could have been avoided had strict adherence to compliance
systems been followed at the company or had the company had better
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supervisory means and procedures.
As a result, there may be no need to encourage cooperation with
government investigations. If a defendant committed the wrong while
working for the corporation, it is already in the corporation’s interest to
provide such assistance to the government in its investigations. A failure
to cooperate with the government may lead to a shareholder’s derivative
suit—something that could cost far more to defend than providing
assistance to the government. Further, such investigations will provide
guidance on how to better assess a director or employee’s actions and
place the corporation on alert for future misconduct. Those opposed
to corporations recovering for expenses incurred while assisting the
government in its investigations under the MVRA may argue that the
relationship created by the government’s investigation does not exceed
the benefit the corporation receives from the government’s investigative
findings. This is because when the government is investigating a
director or employee’s wrongful conduct, it may not have occurred,
but for the company’s subpar adherence to compliance standards or
semblance of supervisory neglect. Thus, a corporation arguably should
also not be allowed to recover for such expenses.
It is true that corporations do provide jobs, tools, and other goods;
however, when a restitution order is awarded and the corporation
receives that money from the defendant, it is up to the corporation on
where to place that money. The amount recovered may not be used
for maintaining or creating stricter compliance tools and procedures or
creating another compliance officer position. In this respect, restitution
orders may not necessarily increase society’s interest since the company
is reimbursed for expenses that it may have had to incur based on
its neglectful supervision or investigative procedures it should have
undertaken previously, but failed to do.
VIII. Corporate Shareholders as “Victims” under the MVRA
Corporations who succumb to insider trading schemes or other
corrupt practices are not the only victims of such wrongful conduct.
Since Congress intended corporations to recover from the benefits of the
MVRA, then it follows that a corporation’s investors and shareholders
should also be able to recover from the MVRA. For example, since
corporations can recover for the losses incurred in spending resources
due to the wrongdoing of a defendant, then investors and shareholders
should also be able to recover as victims for the failure of the company
to properly supervise the defendant’s actions and/or for the defendant’s
misconduct.
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Shareholders may claim that these actions affected the corporation
and its share value in a negative manner. Shareholders may prove the
causal connection by asserting that “but for” the defendant’s action
in defrauding the company, they would not have been harmed. For
example, if a defendant is convicted of a white-collar crime, this fact
in itself brings negative attention to the corporation and causes the
share price of the corporation to decrease. Thus, it can be considered
reasonable and foreseeable that a fraud committed by a director or
employee of the company would hurt the corporation and, at the same
token, hurt those investors in the corporation.115
Courts have permitted MVRA restitution for investors for costs
stemming from a defendant’s conduct committed in a scheme or
conspiracy.116 For example, in United States v. Ross, the court found
a president and CEO of a company guilty of wire fraud and money
laundering in a scheme where the defendant fraudulently obtained
financing fees from individuals and other businesses and would
then reject the loans since it could not provide such financing.117 The
individuals who were defrauded included stockholders who were
seeking reimbursement of the $3.5 million in expenses they paid as
advanced financing fees in the defendant’s scheme to defraud.118 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the
language of preliminary commitment agreements, which allowed for
the transfer of the fees and found in favor of the stockholders who
paid such fees and were proximately harmed by the defendant’s fraud
scheme.119 Thus, if a stockholder would like to recover for investments
made in a corporation where those investments were lost due to a
scheme or conspiracy to commit white-collar crimes, victims, or in this
See United States v. Marino, 654 F.3d 310 (2d Cir. 2011) (requiring defendant to pay investors
for concealment of Ponzi scheme that was the cause in fact and proximate cause for investors’ loss);
United States v. Kline, 199 F. Supp. 2d 922 (D. Minn. 2002) (finding that shareholder was entitled to
restitution as a victim of insider trading since insider trading was material to shareholder’s stock
sale); F.D.I.C. v. Howse, 802 F. Supp. 1554 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (“In deciding whether shareholder may
bring nonderivative action, court looks to nature of wrong, whether to shareholders as whole or
only to shareholder hurt by misconduct.”).
116
See United States v. Dove, 585 F. Supp. 2d 865 (W.D. Va. 2008) (imposing restitution in copyright
infringement crime based on the high number of victims and the difficulty in identifying harm
to the victims); United States v. Ferguson, 584 F. Supp. 2d 447 (D. Conn. 2008) (also refusing
to impose restitution since the case was too complicated as to make the MVRA applicable in
that, the court could not identify all the victims); United States v. Ojeikere, 545 F.3d 220 (2d Cir.
2008); United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2006) (vacating restitution order since order
required defendant to pay restitution to persons who were not victims since they had made stock
purchases after the stock fraud conspiracy ended or were co-conspirators in the fraud).
117
210 F.3d 916 (8th Cir. 2000).
118
Ross, 210 F.3d at 924 (“The $3.5 million merely reflects the fees collected by [the company]
and does not include expenditures made by would-be borrowers in reliance on the promise of
funding, which trial testimony suggests far exceeds the challenged restitution ordered.”).
119
Id.
115
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case investors, can only recover if they prove that they were directly and
proximately harmed by the conspiracy.120 This requires “that the harm
to the victim be closely related to the scheme, rather than tangentially
linked.”121 Moreover, a restitution award for a defendant convicted of
a crime involving a conspiracy, scheme, or pattern of criminal activity
may cover losses for related conduct for which the defendant was not
convicted.122
In United States v. Collardeau, stockholders who lost money on
investments in a public company as a result of a securities, mail and
wire fraud conspiracy were not found to be victims under the MVRA.123
The government had requested damages for three separate classes of
shareholder-victims. The United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey found that it was difficult to determine identifiable victims
since liability was not clear by the factual record presented and the court
had to devote more resources to the case other than just calculating
damages. The court explained, “[t]he kind of case that Congress had in
mind was one in which liability is clear from the information provided
by the government and the defendant and all the sentencing court
has to do is calculate damages.”124 This opinion sheds further light on
the obstacles shareholders may face if they seek restitution under the
MVRA.
The court in Collardeau discussed what type of proof is required in
order for victim shareholders to successfully prevail under the MVRA.
The investor, in reality the government on behalf of the investor, must
offer proof that the harm suffered by the investor was part of the offense
underlying the conviction. The shareholder must establish causation
and show that the corporation harmed her directly. For example, in
a securities fraud case, the shareholder must prove both transaction
causation and loss causation.125
18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2) (Supp. 2012). See, e.g., United States. v. Hall, 467 Fed. App’x. 47 (2d Cir.
2012) (holding that clients who worked with defendant, convicted of conspiracy, were victims
and entitled to restitution for lost profits resulting from their payment of fees to defendant to
purchase fraudulent investment vehicles).
121
United States v. Kones, 77 F.3d 66, 71 (3d Cir. 1996).
122
See Beth Bates Holliday, Annotation, Who Is a “Victim” Entitled to Restitution Under the
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A), 26 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 283 (2008); see also
Sarah N. Welling, Restitution, 3 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Crim. § 546 (4th ed. 2012) (citing United States
v. Elson, 577 F.3d 713 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Maturin, 488 F.3d 657, 661 (5th Cir. 2007);
United States v. Fogg, 409 F.3d 1022 (8th Cir. 2005)).
123
2005 WL 1106475 (D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2005).
124
Id. (citing United States v. Kones, 77 F.3d 66, 69 (3d Cir. 1996)).
125
Id. (“Transaction causation . . . requires only an allegation that ‘but for the claimed
misrepresentations or omissions, the plaintiff would not have entered into the detrimental
securities transaction.’”) (citing Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d
154, 172–73 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Loss causation demonstrates that the fraudulent misrepresentation
120
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Shareholders can use transaction causation to prove a shareholder’s
reasonable reliance under the fraud-on-the-market theory.126 Further,
victims could use a theory of illiquidity to demonstrate transaction
causation. Under this theory, a shareholder asserts “no reasonable
investor would have purchased [the corporation’s] stock if he was
aware of [the defendant’s] conduct.”127
In order to prove loss causation, the shareholder must demonstrate
a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and a victim’s
loss128 by proving that the defendant’s conduct directly caused loss to
the investors. Price fluctuations must occur after the public becomes
aware of the conduct underlying a conspiracy, i.e. when the defendant
is indicted or when the conspiracy is revealed.129
Another hurdle shareholders must surpass is proving that they
are identifiable victims under the MVRA and not so large “as to make
restitution impracticable.”130 In cases where there are numerous victims,
a court may invoke the “complication exceptions” to the imposition of
mandatory restitution under § 3663A(c)(3)(a)–(b).131 The court must be
provided with enough factual information so as to readily determine
the victim, the calculation of damages, and the specific conduct that
caused the damages “without conducting either an evidentiary hearing
or continued supplemental briefing.”132
Courts have invoked the complexity exceptions in denying
shareholder restitution.133 For example, in United States v. Reifler, the
actually caused the loss suffered.”) and Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 172 (2d Cir.
2005)).
126
Id. (“Causation lies in the fact that the plaintiff relied on the market price of the security as an
indicator of the future value of the stock[.]”) (citing Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361,
373 (3d Cir. 2002)).
127
Id.
128
See id. (citing Kones, 77 F.3d at 69); see also Cummings, 189 F.Supp.2d at 76–77 (indicating that in
criminal restitution cases, a loss causation analysis applies).
129
Id.
130
18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(3)(a) (Supp. 2012).
131
See United States v. Rigas, 409 F.3d 555, 563 (2d Cir. 2005) (upholding a district court’s
application of MVRA exceptions in that there were too many victims and the factual issues were
too complex that it would extend the sentencing process too long); United States v. Catoggio, 326
F.3d 323, 326–27 (2d Cir. 2003) (vacating a restitution order and remanding after finding that the
methods employed by the district court were not in accordance with the procedures Congress set
forth in the MVRA since even though the victims and losses were identifiable, it would take too
much time to “unravel the effects of a complex scheme of the type used by [the defendant] and his
co-conspirators to perpetrate this fraud.”).
132
Collardeau, 2005 WL 1106475 at *1.
133
See Dove, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 865 (refusing to impose restitution in copyright infringement
crime based on the high number of victims and the difficulty in identifying harm to the victims);
see also Catharine M. Goodwin et al., Narrow “Complication” Exception for Mandatory Restitution: 18
U.S.C.A. § 3663A(c)(3), Federal Criminal Restitution § 4:14 (2012) (citing United States v. Ferguson,
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Second Circuit vacated a restitution order since the order required a
defendant to pay restitution to persons not considered victims.134 The
court held that those persons were not proper victims under the MVRA
since they had made stock purchases after the stock fraud conspiracy
ended or were co-conspirators in the fraud.135 The Second Circuit
explained:
Congress plainly intended that sentencing courts not
become embroiled in intricate issues of proof, as it
provided that the MVRA is to be inapplicable if the court
finds that the determination of complex factual issues
related to the cause or amount of the victims’ losses
would unduly burden the sentencing process. This
provision reflects Congress’ intention that the process
of determining an appropriate order of restitution be
streamlined . . . and that the restitution determination
be made quickly.136
Thus, if the court is not provided with enough factual information,
a court will not apply the MVRA since it would involve “determining
complex issues of fact” and would “complicate or prolong the
sentencing process[.]”137
The hurdles presented above may be difficult for a shareholder to
overcome, even with enough and adequate factual information. In cases
where a shareholder requests restitution under the MVRA, a court may
impose a strict reading and application of the statute since shareholders
are sufficiently protected in terms of liability. Shareholders are limited to
the investments they make in a company and they are free to voluntarily
buy or sell their shares. Perhaps those investors or shareholders with
majority positions may have more means of providing enough factual
information regarding their status as an identifiable victim, calculation
of their damages, and the specific conduct that caused those damages.
Thus, in these cases, a court may be willing to consider them as victims
entitled to benefit from the MVRA.

584 F. Supp. 2d 447 (D. Conn. 2008) (“the court concluded the numerous shareholders of the
mutual funds who lost money in the fraud could not be sufficiently identified without undue
complication[.]”).
134
446 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2006).
135
Id. at 136.
136
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also United States v. Edwards, 162 F.3d
87, 91 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[L]egislative history also evinces a Congressional intent to streamline the
administration of restitution within the criminal justice system[.]”).
137
18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(3)(b) (Supp. 2012).
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Conclusion
The MVRA by its very terms provides for mandatory restitution
of an identifiable victim for a defendant’s wrongful conduct in
federal crimes. The MVRA was passed in order to recognize the
impact the crime has on the victim and to ensure that the defendant
be held accountable to repay these costs.138 Since corporations have
fallen victims to fraud, deceit, insider trading, and other white-collar
crimes more recently, it is only appropriate for the MVRA to apply
to corporations as well. Further, the legislative history provides that,
in enacting the MVRA, Congress wanted to ensure that all victims
who fall within the ambit of the MVRA be afforded such mandatory
restitution. Thus, a corporation should be entitled to restitution for any
offense committed by a former corporate director, officer, or employee
that has directly and proximately caused harm to the corporation and
the offense is covered under the MVRA.
These remedial principles form the foundation of the MVRA.
Thus, Judge Rakoff’s decision in United States v. Gupta139 does seem to
promote the purpose of the MVRA in holding Gupta accountable to
Goldman Sachs. Although the opinion lacks a discussion on whether
or not Congress intended for corporations, specifically and literally,
to benefit from the MVRA, it is indisputable that Goldman Sachs was
an identifiable victim of Gupta’s wrongful misconduct. The company
had to expend millions of dollars to cooperate with the government
due to Gupta’s misconduct. Moreover, employees had to devote time
away from their usual roles within the company in order to sit in on
depositions and interviews with internal investigative staff as well as
government staff. An award of restitution in favor of Goldman Sachs
demonstrates the court’s recognition of the impact the insider trading
conspiracy and related securities law offenses had upon Goldman
Sachs. A restitution award in Goldman Sachs favor ensures that Gupta
is held accountable and forced to repay the losses suffered and incurred
by Goldman Sachs. Such an award makes them financially whole.
Corporations have proved to be successful in their requests for
restitution in recent years. In light of the regulations protecting market
integrity, it is likely that corporations will continue to benefit from
mandatory restitution under the MVRA. A corporation has to take
adequate measures to protect itself from wrongful conduct especially if
that conduct occurs within the organization. Corporations have much
damage control to do to protect the company in terms of its share
138
139

S. Rep. 104-179, at 18 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 931.
2013 WL 662954, at *1.
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value and its shareholders, especially if it is a public corporation like
Goldman Sachs. Therefore, expenses for attorney’s fees, costs incurred
in assisting the government, internal investigative costs, and auditing
costs have been considered as such adequate measures.
It may appear that courts are providing corporations with an
automatic refund for these types of expenses and affording a defendant
little protection in defending against a corporate giant. However, by
allowing for recovery of these costs, the MVRA further promotes
and instills a cooperative relationship between the private and public
sector, which in turn may help to protect all current and future victims.
Further, courts and Congress are aware of the benefit that corporations
offer in providing jobs and furthering economic growth. Thus,
under a balancing test, in terms of promoting a social impact, a court
should punish a defendant for wrongful conduct committed upon a
corporation even if it is a large “victim.” Congress enacted the MVRA
for the benefit of the public, and corporations should continue to be
included and treated as part of that public.

